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Abstract
Objective: Depersonalization refers to the sensation of being detached from
one’s body, often associated with feelings of loss of control over one’s own
body, actions, or thoughts. Derealization refers to the altered perception of
one’s surroundings that is experienced as unreal. Although usually reported by
psychiatric patients suffering from depression or anxiety, single case reports and
small case series have described depersonalization- and derealization-like symp-
toms in the context of epilepsy. Methods: We investigated the brain mecha-
nisms of ictal depersonalization– and derealization like symptoms by analyzing
clinical and neuropsychological data as well as the epileptogenic zone based on
a multimodal approach in a group of patients reporting depersonalization-
(n = 9) and derealization-like symptoms (n = 7), from a single presurgical epi-
lepsy center with focal epilepsy. We compared them with a group of control
patients with experiential phenomena due to temporal lobe epilepsy (n = 28).
Results: We show that all patients with ictal depersonalization-like symptoms
report altered self-identification with their body and mostly suffer from frontal
lobe epilepsy with the epileptogenic zone in the dorsal premotor cortex, while
patients with derealization-like symptoms suffer from temporal lobe epilepsy.
This finding is supported by post-ictal neuropsychological deficits, showing that
depersonalization-like symptoms were significantly more often associated with
frontal lobe dysfunction as compared to the control patients and patients with
derealization-like symptoms. Conclusion: We argue that depersonalization of
epileptic origin constitutes a distinct disorder due to frontal lobe epilepsy. We
discuss these findings with respect to earlier accounts of depersonalization and
the recent concept of bodily self-consciousness.
Introduction
During depersonalization (DP) patients report to be
detached from and often associated with feelings of loss
of control over one’s own body. These sensations may or
may not be associated with an altered perception of one’s
surroundings that is experienced as unreal, for example
derealization (DR).1 Historically, it has been proposed
that DP and DR constitute two distinct phenomena.2–4
However, currently depersonalization/derealization disor-
der (DDD) has been classified as a single dissociative
disorder, requiring persistent and/or recurrent episodes of
DP and/or DR.5
Although DP and DR are often reported by psychiatric
patients suffering from depression6 and anxiety,7 and even
though DSM-V specifies that DDD should “not be attri-
butable to another medical condition”, DP- and DR-like
phenomena have been reported in patients with
epilpesy,8–12 after cortical electrical stimulation,10,11 and
in patients following traumatic brain injury.8,13 However,
these reports were in majority single case studies12 or
small case series.3,8,10,11 Moreover, due to the lack of
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studies applying quantitative lesion analysis, to date the
phenomenological distinction between DP and DR as well
as any potential distinct brain mechanisms remain poorly
understood.3,14
Sierra and Berrios3 highlight the role of the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex in DP, proposing that prefrontal hyper-
activity and limbic inhibition results in a decrease of
autonomic responses to emotional stimuli and thereby
causing the sensation of detachment from the body and
self.15,16 DR on the other hand has been linked to the
temporal–occipital cortex,3 in line with the observation of
DR-like experiences during experiential phenomena due
to temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE).4,8,9 Simeon and col-
leagues17 have studied the brain mechanisms in a group
of eight patients suffering from DDD using positron
emission tomography (PET). They demonstrated a hyper-
metabolism in the parietal cortex, that correlated with
symptoms of both persistent DP and DR, arguing that
DP is due to a failure of integration of bodily signals in
sensory association areas.
In the present study we aimed to investigate the neural
correlates of DP and DR by analysing clinical and neu-
ropsychological data in a group of patients with epilepsy
suffering from focal epilepsy and ictal DP- and DR-like
phenomena. Given the historical link of both DP- and
DR-like phenomena as part of experiential phenomena
with temporal lobe epilepsy,4,8,9 we also investigated a con-
trol group consisting of patients suffering from deja vu or
experiential hallucinations due to temporal lobe epilepsy,
as reported previously.18 We localized the epileptogenic
zone, using a multimodal approach as described previ-
ously.18–21 In addition, we analyzed our patients’ symp-
toms with respect to the recently introduced concept of
bodily self-consciousness (BSC) (see 22). We hypothesized
that the seizure onset, but also findings from the neuropsy-
chological examination and the semiology in respect to
alterations of BSC can be dissociated in patients suffering
from DP-like phenomena from patients with DR-like phe-
nomena and patients with other experiential phenomena.
Material and Methods
Patients
From a population of 450 patients suffering from intract-
able epilepsy undergoing presurgical evaluation in the
Epilepsy Unit at the university hospital of Geneva
between 1998 and 2011, we retrospectively selected
patients meeting the following inclusion criteria: patients
reporting (1) DP (e.g. illusory detachment from their
body, as if being an outside observer, often associated
with feelings of loss of control over one’s own body,
actions, or thoughts) and (2) DR (e.g. altered perception
of one’s surroundings that is experienced as strange or
unreal) as part of their habitual seizure semiology. More-
over, patients reporting deja vu (DV) or experiential hal-
lucinations (EH) were selected from the same population
as an additional control group (see 18). Patients were only
included if they could be unequivocally assigned to one
of the above mentioned four groups according to their
semiology. Patients who suffered from DP and DR at the
same time, were not included in the analysis. Selection of
patients was based on the detailed clinical records taken
at the time of evaluation. However, due to the retrospec-
tive nature of the study no systematic questionnaire could
be employed. Patient reports were systematically analyzed
for the three major aspects of BSC as reported previously,
for example self-identification with the body (i.e., the
experience that the physical body and its parts belong to
me), self-location (i.e., the experience of where my body
is located in space), and first–person perspective (i.e., the
experience from where I experience to perceive the
world).22,23 Ethics approval was obtained from the Ethics
committee at the university hospital of Geneva.
Basic patient characteristics (age, sex, handedness, sei-
zure frequency, seizure duration, neurological examina-
tion, interictal und post-ictal neuropsychological
examination, psychiatric comorbidities, surgical therapy,
postsurgical outcome) were compared over the four
groups.
Multimodal evaluation of the epileptogenic
zone
All patients underwent phase I evaluation, including
structural magnet resonance imaging (MRI) and func-
tional imaging techniques [interictal and ictal surface
electroencephalography (EEG), PET, ictal and interictal
single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT)].
Eight patients underwent phase II evaluation, including
intracranial EEG.
All imaging data were analyzed at the time of the origi-
nal exploration and then reviewed for the purpose of this
study by two of the authors in order to determine the
epileptogenic zone (Lukas Heydrich and Guillaume Maril-
lier). Anatomical structures were labeled according to the
AAL atlas implemented in MRIcron (http://www.mccaus
landcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron).
In order to illustrate the neural correlates underlying
DP and DR we subsequently traced the epileptic zone for
each patient on the T1 template using MRIcron.19,20,24
Structural lesions were identified using MRI. The func-
tional relevance of these lesions was confirmed by a mul-
timodality imaging approach,25,26 which combines
structural with coregistered functional imaging. This mul-
timodal approach is classically used to improve the ability
2 ª 2019 The Authors. Annals of Clinical and Translational Neurology published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc on behalf of American Neurological Association.
Depersonalization- and Derealization-Like Phenomena L. Heydrich et al.
to detect and define the extent of temporal and extra-
temporal epileptogenic tissue.26 MRI brain scans were
normalized to the smoothed T1 template using SPM5
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5).27 As
unified segmentation models give the most precise regis-
tration of lesioned structural images,28 no cost–function
masking was necessary. Functional imaging (PET, SPECT)
was normalized using SPM5 and coregistered to the nor-
malized MRI scans. The epileptogenic tissue as suggested
by the multimodality imaging was subsequently traced
manually slice by slice either on the individual normalized
brain scans or on the T1 weighted images using MRIcron
(http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/rorden/mricron).24 The later
manual tracing on the template brain was only done
when confidence could be achieved for matching corre-
sponding slices between the lesioned brain and the tem-
plate brain. If functional imaging highlighted brain areas
adjacent to the structural lesions, these were included into
the lesion analysis as well (following the approach used
by 19). No patients with unclear lesion boundaries or
metallic artifacts were included into the analysis. Lesion
volumes (volume of interest, VOI) were determined as
the sum of all voxels compromising the traced lesion in
all slices and were spatially smoothed using a 5 mm full
width at half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian Kernel and a
threshold of 0.5.
The same procedure was applied to the control group
(see 18).
Statistical analysis
In a first step, the epileptic focus was attributed to the
dominant or the nondominant hemisphere for language.
Then, in a second step, patients were classified as
suffering from seizures either due to temporal lobe epi-
lepsy (TLE) and medial temporal lobe epilepsy (MTLE),
respectively, frontal lobe epilepsy (FLE), parietal lobe epi-
lepsy (PLE) or occipital lobe epilepsy (OLE).
For subsequent statistical analysis, we performed a chi-
square test for independent samples between the four
groups, respectively the Fisher’s exact test, if the expected
frequencies were <1.
Results of post-ictal (in the immediate postictal period)
and inter-ictal neuropsychological evaluation including
tests of executive function (word and figural fluency),
verbal and visuo-spatial memory, attention, gnosis, and
language were also analyzed using a chi-square test for
independent samples, or the Fisher’s exact test, respec-
tively, if the expected frequencies were <1. The P-value
was adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Holmes-
Bonferroni method.
Results
Description of the patient sample
Demographics and clinical characteristics
Sixteen patients undergoing presurgical evaluation in the
Epilepsy unit at the university hospital of Geneva between
1998 and 2011 fulfilled the criteria for DP/DR and were
selected retrospectively for this study: Nine patients with
ictal DP and seven patients with ictal DR (for patients
with DV and EH see below).
Demographic and clinical (see below) parameters did
not significantly differ between the two groups (all
P > 0.05, see Table 1). Six patients were male, 10 female,
with an average age at evaluation of 33 years (SD
3.2 years). Fourteen patients were right-handed (87.5%)
Table 1. Demographic patient characteristics in patients with DP, DR. DV and EH.
Depersonalization
N = 9
Derealization
N = 7
Deja
vu
N = 16
Experiential
hallucinations
N = 12 P value
Male/female 3/6 3/4 7/9 8/4 >0.05
Age at evaluation (years) 33.8 32.0 32.0 32.4 >0.05
Handedness (right/left/ambidextrous) 7/2/0 7/0/0 14/1/1 11/0/1 >0.05
Duration of epilepsy (years) 14.4 16.5 12.6 11.4 >0.05
Seizure frequency (p.a.) 335 562 238 153 >0.05
Neurological examination
(normal/pathological)
4/5 4/3 12/4 9/3 >0.05
Family history (positive/negative)1 2/7 2/5 1/13 1/9 >0.05
Psychiatric diagnosis (yes/no) 0/9 1/6 3/5 4/2 0.019
Surgical therapy (yes/no) 7/2 5/2 13/3 9/3 >0.05
Favourable outcome after surgery (yes/
no/unknown)2
4/3 4/1 13/0 6/2/1 0.05
1Information could not be retrieved retrospectively for all the patients, therefore N differs from the total N.
2Refers only to the patients being operated (N = 34). Significance level after correction for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni correction) = 0.004.
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and two were left-handed (12.5%). The nondominant
hemisphere for language was the right hemisphere in 15
cases (93%) and the left hemisphere in one case (7%), as
confirmed using fMRI, WADA testing and/or neuropsy-
chological assessment.
The average duration of epilepsy was 14 years (SD
12.9). Neurological examination was normal in eight
(50%) patients. Three patients (out of 13 patients where
a family history could be retrieved) presented with a posi-
tive family history for epilepsy (23 %). A psychiatric diag-
nosis prior to admission was present in two patients
(12.5%, e.g. eating disorder and light to moderate depres-
sive episode, panic disorder).
Surgical treatment was performed in 12 out of 16
patients (75%). Information about follow–up examina-
tions was available in all patients after surgery. A favor-
able outcome (seizure free or significant seizure control
after 3 months) was achieved in eight patients (66.6%).
Four patients (33.3%) did not benefit from the surgical
procedure.
For further details please refer to Table 1.
No significant difference regarding the demographic
and clinical parameters was found between DP versus DR
or versus the additional control group consisting of 28
patients reporting DV or EH (all P > 0.05).
For further details please refer to Table 1.
Semiology. Depersonalization
Nine patients reported a sensation of DP during their sei-
zures. Seven patients reported the sensation of being
detached from own bodily experience (e.g. touch), of
whom four patients reported the sensation of full or
hemi-body numbness. One patient claimed that a stranger
would have entered his body, while three patients said
that they lost control over the body and their actions.
Table 2. Clinical characteristics and semiology in patients with DP.
Patient Diagnosis Lesion Lesion analysis Neurology Semiology
DP 1 Epilepsy/dysplasia Parietal cortex (L) MRI, EEG, PET,
SPECT
Vertigo and tinnitus Feeling to lose the control over
the right hemi-body, feeling of
the right arm being elevated
while the right side of the trunk
was lowered relative to the left
side
DP 2 Epilepsy/oligodendroglioma Frontal cortex (R) MRI, EEG, PET,
SPECT
Impaired short term and
working memory
Altered touch (whole body),
dissociation of body and mind
(feeling detached of the body
without leaving the body)
DP 3 Epilepsy/autoimmune Temporal cortex
(R)
MRI, EEG, PET,
SPECT
Executive dysfunction Feeling that someone enters her
body, takes control of the body
DP 4 Epilepsy/dysplasia Frontal cortex (R) MRI, EEG, PET,
SPECT
Normal Feeling that his body is useless, is
not feeling his body, he thinks
that his body is disconnected
from his head
DP 5 Epilepsy/DNET Parieto-occipital
cortex (R)
MRI, EEG, PET,
SPECT
Normal Detachment of physical body,
strong visual-vestibular
sensations
DP 6 Epilepsy/posttraumatic Frontal and
temporo-parietal
cortex (R)
MRI, EEG Left hemi-neglect (visual,
sensory, auditory)/
Anosognosia and
prosopagnosia
Detachment of physical body,
strong visual-vestibular
sensations
DP 7 Epilepsy/inflammatory lesion Frontal cortex (L) MRI, EEG,
SPECT
Discrete motor hemi-
syndrome right/Semantic
paraphasia
Altered touch of the right hand
has changed, right side of body
feels strange
DP 8 Epilepsy/neurocysteriosis Frontal cortex,
Insula (R)
MRI, EEG Left hemi-spatial neglect/
left-sided
diadochokinesis and
dysmetria
Loosing control of left hand,
detachment and feeling of a
presence
DP 9 Epilepsy/vasculitis Frontal and
occipital cortex
(L)
MRI, EEG Right sided sensorimotor
hemi-syndrome, right
hemianopia
Sensation of body distortion,
detachment
PET, positron emission tomography; MRI, magnet resonance imaging; EEG, electroencephalography; SPECT, single photon emission computed
tomography; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute.
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Although no DP patient described a change in self-loca-
tion or first–person perspective, all DP patients reported
disturbed self-identification or body ownership with their
body (to varying degrees).
Table 2 provides more detailed information on individ-
ual reports.
Semiology. Derealization
DR was reported by seven patients and mostly involved
the sensation as if the environment felt unreal, far away,
perceived through a veil, like in a dream or being in a
film. No change of self-location, first–person perspective
or self-identification was reported by any of the patients
with DR.
Neuropsychological testing
Interictal neuropsychological testing was available in 15
out of the 16 patients (93%) suffering from DP or DR.
Post-ictal neuropsychological testing was available in nine
patients (56%). Testing of frontal lobe functions (e.g.
executive functions, such as fluency) in the immediate
postictal phase was significantly more often pathologic in
patients reporting DP (78%) as compared to DR (0%;
Chi2 = 6.78, P < 0.01), as well as DV and EH
(Chi2 = 20.3, P < 0.001). None of the other neuropsycho-
logical test scores (inter- and post-ictal) showed a signifi-
cant difference between DP and DR.
Comparing DP, DR, EH and DV showed a significant
effect of post-ictal (P = 0.012) and inter-ictal (P = 0.038)
language problems being more frequent in the group of
patients suffering from EH as compared to DP, DR and
DV.
The epileptogenic zone based on a
multimodal evaluation
Surface EEG was available in 100% of the patients,
intracranial EEG was available in 18% of the patients.
MRI in 100% of the patients, volumetry in 25% of the
patients, spectroscopy in 43% of the patients, PET in
68% of the patients, interictal SPECT in 68% of the
patients, and ictal SPECT in 62.5% of the patients. No
statistical difference for the availability of the different
imaging techniques was found between any of the groups
(all P > 0.05).
DP (N = 9) was associated with a seizure onset in non-
dominant hemisphere for seven patients (77%) and in the
dominant hemisphere in two patients (23%). DR (N = 7)
was associated with a seizure onset on the nondominant
hemisphere in four patients (57%) and the dominant
hemisphere in three patients (43%, n.s.). In seven patients
with DP a multimodal evaluation identified the frontal
lobe as the primary epileptic focus (n = 7; 77%), whereas
none of the patients suffering from DR had frontal lobe
involvement (e.g. FLE; Chi2 = 6.78, P < 0.01). Two
patients with DP (23%) and six patients with DR (85%)
were primarily suffering from MTLE (Chi2 = 6.34,
P = 0.01). We then compared the seizure onset zone in
patients suffering from DP and DR with the seizure onset
zone in patients suffering from DV and EH due to MTLE.
Statistical analysis revealed that patients with DP were
suffering significantly more often from frontal lobe epi-
lepsy as compared to DV, DR, EH (x2 = 20.3, P < 0.001),
while DR, DV and EH could be linked to MTLE as com-
pared to DP (x2 = 12.96, P < 0.001). The dominant
hemisphere for language was significantly more often
involved in patients with EH as compared to the other
three other groups (DV, DR, DP), which were mostly due
to a seizure onset zone in the nondominant hemisphere
for language (x2 = 10.13, P = 0.02).
Maximal overlap of the epileptogenic zone
Figures 1 and 2 shows the results of the voxel–based over-
lap analysis of the epileptogenic zone. In the DP group,
our analysis revealed the right medio-dorsal premotor
cortex (PMC) as the region of maximal overlap. This
Figure 1. Epileptogenic zone in patients with ictal depersonalization-
like phenomena. Lesion overlap analysis highlighted the right medio-
dorsal premotor cortex (PMC) [cantered on Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) x = 18, y = 5, z = 59, Brodmann area 6], which was
found to be involved in in five out of nine patients with DP. The
number of overlapping lesions is illustrated by color, from violet
(n = 3) to red (maximal lesion overlap, n = 5).
ª 2019 The Authors. Annals of Clinical and Translational Neurology published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc on behalf of American Neurological Association. 5
L. Heydrich et al. Depersonalization- and Derealization-Like Phenomena
zone was anterior to the precentral gyrus and mainly
involved the superior frontal gyrus, extending towards the
supplementary motor area and the medial prefrontal cor-
tex. Maximal overlap was found for five out of nine
patients [Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) x = 18,
y = 5, z = 59, Brodman area 6, Fig. 1]. For the DR
group the same analysis highlighted the right MTL (maxi-
mal overlap in the right hippocampus/posterior MTL in
four out of seven patients, MNI x = 28, y = 21,
z = 14, Fig. 2).
For the display of the seizure onset zone in patients
with DV and EH please refer to the original work by
Heydrich et al.18
Discussion
In the present study we investigated the brain mecha-
nisms of DP and compared them with those associated
with DR in a group of patients suffering from pharmaco–
resistant epilepsy. Overall, DP was rare and only found in
approximately 3.5% in our sample. All DP patients
reported altered self-identification with their body during
their seizures (and normal self-location and first–person
perspective), while no change in BSC was reported in DR.
DP was due to FLE in seven out of nine patients, while
DR (as well as DV and EH, which served as a control
group), were linked to MTLE. Using a multimodal
approach we were able to demonstrate that the epilepto-
genic zone in patients with DP was located in the medio-
dorsal premotor cortex, extending towards the supple-
mentary motor area and the medial prefrontal cortex.
This finding was also supported by the analysis of the
post-ictal neuropsychological exam showing that DP was
significantly more often associated with a (pre-) frontal
lobe dysfunction, for example executive dysfunction, as
compared to DR, DV and EH.
To the best of our knowledge there are only anecdotal
data on the neuropsychological profile in patients suffer-
ing from DP.8 Interestingly, Guralnik et al.29 demon-
strated in a group of 21 patients suffering from DDD a
disruption in early perceptual and attentional processes,
reflecting a dysfunction of a dorsal fronto-parietal net-
work30 and thus supporting our data to a certain extent.
However, we note the limitation of analysing the results
of the immediate post-ictal neuropsychological examina-
tion, for example neuropsychological examination not
being possible or incomplete in half of the patients. We
also not that a direct comparison of the neuropsychologi-
cal profile of patients suffering from persistent DP and
those suffering of DP of epileptic origin is difficult.
Therefore, a more systematic, ideally prospective
approach is needed to better establish the neuropsycho-
logical profile in patients suffering from DP of neurologi-
cal origin.
Ictal DP was characterized by the illusory perception of
being detached from one’s own body experience (e.g. sen-
sation of full or hemi-body numbness) and emotions, to
no longer identify with the body, including the sensation
of losing control over the body. This resembles what has
been described in patients suffering from DP in the con-
text of psychiatric disorders, including DDD,8,31 although
the latter requires persistent and/or recurrent episodes of
depersonalization and/or derealization5 and it has been
proven difficult to distinguish DP due to an underlying
organic disease from DP in the context of a (coexisting)
psychiatric disorder.8
Importantly, based on subjective reports, DP could be
dissociated from DR in our patient sample. Patients suf-
fering from DR did not describe a detachment from the
body but rather from the nonbodily surroundings, for
example that things seemed unreal, far away or even dis-
torted and like in a dream. Finally, concerning the three
key aspects of BSC, only self-identification with the body
or body ownership was abnormal in patients with DP,
whereas self-location and first–person perspective were
unaffected. This differed from patients with DR-like
symptoms, in whom no alterations of BSC were noted.
These subjective reports illustrate that DP can not only
be differentiated from DR, but also from other complex
Figure 2. Epileptogenic zone in patients with ictal derealization-like
phenomena. Lesion overlap analysis highlighted the right posterior
mesial temporal lobe (MTL) [centered on Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) x = 28, y = 21, z = 14], which was found to be
involved in four out of seven patients with DR. The number of
overlapping lesions is illustrated by color, from violet (n = 2) to red
(maximal lesion overlap, n = 4).
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illusory own body perceptions of neurological origin,
especially autoscopic phenomena, such as the feeling of a
presence,21 out of body experiences (OBE)19 and heau-
toscopy (HAS).20,23 While in the latter two conditions
patients might also report a certain degree of depersonal-
ization,20 it should be noted that in addition to the sensa-
tion of self-detachment and loss of self-identification with
the physical body, a strong identification with an addi-
tional illusory own body (visual or nonvisual, for example
HAS, OBE) and/or a change of self-location and change
of the first–person perspective (e.g. OBE) is required in
order to fulfil the diagnostic criteria for autoscopic phe-
nomena.22 Although patients with DP experience the
body as foreign, numb and not belonging to oneself or
may describe the mental state characterizing DP as if they
were looking at themselves from the outside, none of our
patients with ictal DP reported an actual change of the
first–person perspective. Thus, compared to patients with
OBEs, DP patients usually state that it is a feeling “as if”
they were outside observers of themselves, more compara-
ble to a belief than an illusory visual perception. How-
ever, more detailed studies are required to investigate the
presence of autoscopic phenomena and all three key
aspects of BSC in patients with DP.
How do these data in patients with DP, relate to recent
data on the neural correlates of bodily self-consciousness,
involving self-identification or ownership for the body?
Based on clinical, behavioral and neuroimaging data, it
has been suggested that multisensory integration in the
premotor cortex is a key mechanisms for hand ownership
and self-identification for the full body.32–34 Moreover,
the dorsal and ventral PMC is a region well-known for its
importance in the integration of sensorimotor and multi-
sensory bodily signals.35 PMC processes visual, tactile and
sensory information, related to body parts,33,35,36 the
whole body37 or signals across different body parts.32
Thus, perceived self-identification with a full body has
been linked to and positively correlated with activity of
bilateral PMC.32 Thus, we argue that aberrant epileptic
activity in the PMC results in a loss of self-identification
with body parts of the full body (for discussion see also
12) due to abnormal processing in multisensory regions,
while self-location and first–person perspective, which
have been linked to more posterior brain regions (center-
ing at the temporo-parietal junction and the posterior
insula)19,20,38 remain relatively unaffected.
A careful review of the individual reports given by
patients with DP reveals not only a detachment from bod-
ily experience (e.g. loss of self-identification), but also a
diminished sense of control over one’s actions, for example
a loss of their sense of agency for their body and move-
ments (e.g. patient 4 reported to feel like a robot without
control over his actions and as if losing his identity). We
note that the zone of maximal overlap of the epileptic focus
in the dorsal PMC extended medially to include the supple-
mentary motor area and the medial prefrontal cortex that
have both been involved in the sense of agency and self-
identification.39–41 The supplementary motor area and the
dorsal premotor cortex are well known for their impor-
tance for motor control, motor awareness and the sense of
agency.40 Thus, electric cortical stimulation of the premo-
tor cortex results in involuntary movements without
awareness42,43 and epileptic seizures originating in the sup-
plementary motor area and the medial prefrontal cortex
can cause ictal alien hand phenomena.44 Moreover, the
medial prefrontal cortex has been linked to cognitive
aspects of self–related processing,45 such as self-reference,
self-concept and a mental representation of oneself as a
subject of experience.46 Thus, epileptic activity in the dorsal
premotor cortex and propagation to adjacent supplemen-
tary motor cortex and medial prefrontal cortex might also
interfere with agentive and cognitive aspects of self-con-
sciousness, as seen in DP. Our data are in line with the
account of depersonalization being a disorder hypoemo-
tionality due to a corticolimbic disconnection put forward
by Sierra and colleagues.47,48 While Sierra and Berrios sug-
gest a link between dorsolateral prefrontal hyperactivity
and limbic inhibition (e.g. in the anterior cingulate cortex,
amygdala, insula), resulting in a decrease of autonomic
response to emotional stimuli,15,16 the present data are in
line with the role of the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex in
emotion regulation without direct involvement of limbic
structures.49,50
We note that our finding of the epileptogenic zone
being located in the PMC is in contrast with the study of
Simeon et al.17 showing that hypermetabolism in the pari-
etal cortex in eight patients suffering from DDD is posi-
tively correlated with depersonalization scores. The
parietal cortex has also been linked to other conditions
with illusory own body perception, such as the alien limb
phenomenon51 or postural phantom limb sensation.52
However, this might be because patients with DDD unlike
our patients report both symptoms of DP and DR at the
same and that it is difficult to directly compare patients
with DDD and patients suffering from DP-like symptoms
of epileptic origin. Also, we argue that DP due to epilep-
tic activity in the PMC is associated with a loss of func-
tion (loss of self-identification, loss of agency), which
would be rather reflected by a PET hypometabolism
instead of a hypermetabolism.
A limitation of the study is the fact that, despite the
extensive presurgical workup, in only 66% of our patients a
favorable outcome could be achieved and that only a 3-
month follow-up was retained in all patients. However, we
note that the percentage of favorable outcome is in line
with the numbers reported in the literature and that the
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majority of recurrence of seizures (e.g. 80%) are observed
within the first 6 months after the surgical procedure.53,54
In conclusion, we demonstrate for the first time that
DP of epileptic origin can be linked to the medio-dorsal
PMC. We show that by applying a structured comprehen-
sive analysis of semiology, detailed neuropsychological
evaluation, and by using quantitative lesion analysis, DP
and DR of epileptic origin can be dissociated, for example
that DR (together with other experiential phenomena,
such as DV and EH) is part of the semiology observed in
patients suffering from MTLE while DP can be linked to
FLE and a seizure onset zone in PMC. This supports the
role of the PMC as a part of a neural network underlying
bodily self–consciousness (e.g. self-identification) due to
multisensory integration.
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